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The rapid growth of the Indonesian economy during the 1970s accompanied the emer­
gence of what I called elsewhere a new capitalist class.1 This class differs from its pre-New 
Order counterpart in many respects.2 Although ethnic Chinese remain a dominant segment, 
those who comprise the capitalist class have increasingly included a substantial number of 
indigenous (pribumi) business people, who have accumulated sufficient capital to affect the 
fate of Indonesian capitalism and have entrenched themselves deep in strategic sectors of 
the econojny.
It is important to note, however, that the development of this new capitalist class has 
come about in a sociopolitical and cultural environment that is amiable neither to capitalism 
nor to the Chinese minority. When the Indonesian economy encountered economic crises in 
the 1980s, the disparity between the economic prowess of the new capitalists and their polit­
ical and ideological weaknesses loomed large. The increasing role of the private sector as the 
savior of the post-oil boom economy was called for more emphatically than ever, but anti- 
Chinese sentiment and lack of a "capitalist hegemony" in Indonesian society constrained the 
active contribution of the new capitalists.3 It was against this contradictory backdrop that
^Yoon Hwan Shin, "Demystifying the Capitalist State: Political Patronage, Bureaucratic Interests, and Capitalists- 
in-Formation in Soeharto's Indonesia" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1989).
2Ibid., chap. 6. See also Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 3, and 
Yuri Sato, 'The Development of Business Groups in Indonesia, 1967-1989" (Master's thesis, University of Indo­
nesia, 1989).
3Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoarse and Geoffrey Norwell Smith 
(New York: International Publishers, 1971). Here I follow Allex Callinicos in defining Gramsci's hegemony: "an 
'organizing principle/ or world-view (or combination of such world-views), that is diffused by agencies of ideo­
logical control and socialization into every area of daily life," or "this prevailing consciousness . . .  internalized 
by the broad masses." "As all ruling elites seek to perpetuate their power, wealth, and status," Callinicos ex­
plains, "they necessarily attempt to popularize their own philosophy, culture, morality, etc. and render them un­
challengeable, part of the natural order of things." See Allex Callinicos, Gramsci's Marxism (London: Pluto Press, 
1976), p. 39. For an opposing interpretation of Gramsci's hegemony, see Anne Showstack Sassoon, "Hegemony,
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political and business elites and procapitalist intellectuals came to the fore to advocate a 
market-oriented economic system and ideology. Capitalist hegemony must be created by 
noneconomic forces, especially by the state, as John Saul found in postcolonial societies, be­
cause these societies lack the time and experience required to develop a capitalist culture 
"slowly and surely."4
The creation of capitalist hegemony could not be more opportune than in post-oil boom 
Indonesia. Substantively, the sluggish and strained economy called upon the private sector 
to undertake the leading role in economic growth, which had been played by the state with 
its rich oil revenue. Furthermore, the growing frustration and aggression among small-scale 
business people and the popular sector had to be politically and ideologically accommo­
dated to provide secure situations for the new capitalists and multinationals to invest.
The "ideological modes of economic domination" described here refer to the political 
and cultural efforts elites undertake to insure and perpetuate the economic dominance of an 
emerging new capitalist class. That these efforts were increasingly evident in the 1980s re­
flects that Indonesian capitalism is moving into a more stabilizing stage with a supportive 
ideology. I discuss in this paper: (1) the sociopolitical implications of the recent trend 
toward interracial economic cooperation; (2) the dissemination of capitalist ideas and ethics 
among business people, intellectuals, and government officials; and, most importantly, (3) 
the phaseout of anti-Chinese, indigenist economic policies and their implications.
Toward a National Business Class
Since independence, the concept of private capitalism has had negative connotations in 
Indonesia. Because the Indonesian usage of the term capitalism often accompanies such 
modifiers as free fight after Sukarno used it that way, many Indonesian elites exploited the 
term politically and implanted connotations of inherent chaos, unfairness, and selfishness in 
it. Their suspicion of capitalism was frequently expressed in creative but unsubstantiated 
conceptual forms. During Parliamentary Democracy, there was Assatism; Sukarno popular­
ized communalistic Marhaenism; now under the New Order, much ink has been spilled to 
debate the Pancasila Economic System (Sistem Perekonomian Pancasila). These expressions, 
despite the different emphases and nuances among them, share at least one connotation: a 
hatred of a social stratum that the indigenous society lacks and that was and is occupied by 
the former colonizers and their collaborators. An economic system that leaves or helps them 
go their way was believed to undermine the well-being of the indigenous population. Thus 
alternative ideas were mobilized and put to test. On every trial, however, the result was 
dismal. It is against this hostile historical and social backdrop that the new capitalists, ap­
pearing more balanced in racial representation than before, have emerged in the New Order 
and have been remarkably successful in taking root in the Indonesian economy and, to a 
lesser degree, in society.
The ideological efforts to create and maintain a stable capitalist system are succinctly ex­
pressed in one concept, pengusaha nasional (national entrepreneur), which is replacing previ­
ously popular, racial terms to designate business people belonging to different social and 
economic groups. The stress is on the imported word nasional, which is antithetical to asli or
War of Position and Political Intervention," in Approaches to Gramsci, ed. Ann Showstack Sassoon (London: Writ­
ers and Readers, 1982).
4"The State in Postcolonial Societies: Tanzania," in the Socialist Register 1974, ed. Ralph Miliband and John Saville 
(New York: Monthly Review Press; London: Merlin Press, 1974); reprinted in The State and Revolution in Eastern 
Africa: Essays by John S. Saul, ed. John S. Saul (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1979), p. 170. See 
also Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," New Left Review 74 (1972).
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pribumi. This observation does not imply that this officially promoted term will soon remove 
such still prevalent terms as nonpribumi, orang Cina, orang Tionghoa, or WNI (keturunan) Cina 
(or, simply, WNI) from everyday conversation.51 am simply arguing that the disappearance 
of these terms from the media and government decrees will at least discourage state offi­
cials, business people, and intellectuals from making issues of the Chinese problem. Re­
duced usage also marks a beginning of the end for the government to blame only the Chi­
nese for their "exdusivism." It does not, of course, guarantee that ordinary Indonesians will 
soon accept the new usage. Even so, it should be seen as an effort by the state and the new 
capitalists to create the hegemony of capitalist ideology and culture in society. The term 
implicitly suggests that the entrepreneurs, whether Chinese or indigenous, serve the com­
mon interests of the nation, not their respective racial interests. On a general level, it also 
conveys the concept that capitalism realizes the interests of all, not just the capitalists' class 
interests.
The nomenclatural development has been substantiated by a change in the world of 
business, that is, the increased commercial cooperation among the private business people, 
especially between pribumi and Chinese.6 In a sense, it is an acceptable compromise be­
tween the sobering reality of the invincible Chinese economic position and the unwarranted 
ideal of indigenism.
This cooperation takes the forms of an intrafirm partnership and an interfirm market 
cartel. Joint ventures among big corporations now go beyond racial or ethnic differences. 
The partnership between pribumi and nonpribumi is not new in Indonesia, but what I refer 
to here is a somewhat sincere one, unlike the cukong, Ali-Baba, and Baba-Ali arrangements, 
which are convenient bypasses of legal obstacles. With more pribumi in business and with 
more Chinese confident in the New Order's commitment to the capitalist path, business 
people of the two races have become engaged in a more lasting and earnest form of business 
partnership. In this new form, the indigenous partner is not merely a political contributor 
but a true partner in ownership and management.
Most of the Chinese big business people seem to have increasingly realized that their 
exclusive domination of the economy would spread sentiments of economic indigenism and 
eventually influence the policy making of the state, the signs of which surfaced in the wake 
of the Malari affair. In this sense, it can be argued, it is in their economic as well as political 
interest to see a strong indigenous business sector develop. The establishment of a powerful, 
racially intertwined economic class may revive an anticapitalist mood in society but will 
help prevent racist feelings from besieging the indigenous population. As long as the mili­
tary is firmly in power, the Communists will never be able to regain political vigor. By con­
trast, racial prejudices would easily inflame social unrest and even gain influence among the 
governing elite within the state.
5Both orang Cina and orang Tionghoa refer to a Chinese; the former is considered pejorative by the Chinese In­
donesians. Immediately after Soeharto assumed power, his regime deliberately discouraged the use of orang 
Tionghoa, which is recently regaining ground. See Charles A. Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 157. WNI, pronounced weh-en-ih, stands for Warga Negara Indonesia, 
literally meaning an Indonesian citizen but, in practice, referring only to ethnic Chinese who have obtained 
Indonesian nationality.
6A phrase coined to express the Chinese-pribumi cooperation in business is "pembauran di bidang usaha." Pem- 
bauran, literally mixing, association, or social intercourse, has been primarily used to mean cultural assimilation 
of "non-native" Indonesians. In business, however,—"di bidang usaha" meaning "in the business field"—pem­
bauran does not carry the connotation that a distinctive subculture integrates into the larger universal culture. 
Instead, it simply means mutual cooperation in business between the two racial groups.
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Today, many Chinese companies have pribumi as managers or shareholders and vice 
versa. Admittedly, with nationalist and discriminatory policies still on and off, concerns 
about expediency could become a major reason for the interracial working relationship. But 
as I will elaborate in the final section of this article, such policies in the New Order have had 
little impact upon the big businesses of the Chinese. Thus the recent tendency toward busi­
ness pembauran seems to be an outcome of the new capitalists' conscious realization that 
both their pribumi and Chinese fractions can benefit from the greater economic share of the 
pribumi.
This consciousness is displayed in many de facto market cartels formed in the industries 
developed along the state's import-substitution strategy. The strategy gives significant 
privileges to the existing companies in these industries by demanding higher costs for the 
companies that seek new entry. The number of companies operating in these sectors is kept 
relatively small, which protects inefficient and uncompetitive firms. Although the less com­
petent firms could lose out in limited competition within these sectors, it is also true that the 
more competent firms have found it harmful to drive out completely their weak competi­
tors, which are often pribumi owned. The existence of these indigenous companies may not 
only give an appearance of a healthy competition, instead of a Chinese monopoly, but also 
provide the state with the pretext to maintain its continuous protection of the industrial 
sectors. The new capitalists may believe that their political weakness can be compensated by 
increased class cohesiveness and by their deep entrenchment in the economy. To this end, 
mutual cooperation and interaction among the bigger corporations became increasingly 
noticeable in the 1980s.
Ideological Role of Elites in Creating the Hegemony of Capitalism
The scheme the new capitalists designed to obtain an acceptable dominance has been sup­
ported by many elements of the upper class, including high government officials, business 
people, academicians, and journalists. No doubt, these groups share common interests and 
concerns behind their near-united support for the scheme. But rather unusual in the 1980s 
was that the campaign was carried out in exceptionally open ways.
The catalyst was the recession of the early 1980s, which squeezed budgetary resources 
for public projects and various programs that doled out credit to the already hard-pressed, 
small, indigenous companies. Facing this plight, the state called on big business, including 
the Chinese, first, to move the economy out of the recession, and, second, to take over the 
task of helping the small and medium pribumi-owned companies. During the early 1980s, 
an ideological groundwork was laid to facilitate the state's final abandonment of the racist 
interpretation of the "weak economic group" in implementing economic policy. Naturally, 
those who were most affected by, or related to, the economic situation took charge of the 
ideological task.
I call the concerted effort ideological in the sense that all the suggestions and justifications 
they gave to the policy change remained rhetorical and, in effect, protected the interests of 
the new capitalists. It was carried out in the form of academic debates, public talks, and 
official statements. The participants were overwhelmingly united in their intent. Thus it 
should be called instead a campaign to promote or indoctrinate capitalist ideas. Its core 
arguments included denunciation of the small pribumi capitalists' lack of entrepreneurial 
spirit and of their dependence on government projects and racist policies and, at the same 
time, a eulogy of the free and open market solution to the economic stagnation; the 
constructive role of Chinese entrepreneurs in the Indonesian economy; the voluntary 
assistance by big business to small business; and, generally, the efficacy of the private sector
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and big business. Various associations of indigenous businessmen were in the forefront of 
the campaign.
The Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) demonstrated the most 
obvious interest in accepting the enhanced role of the private sector in business affairs. In 
the early 1980s, the state, in a symbolic gesture, designated KADIN as the only legitimate 
social institution to provide assistance to small and medium (mostly pribumi-owned) com­
panies. After that, KADIN, which was originally organized to protect pribumi business 
interests, collected funds primarily from Chinese entrepreneurs and distributed them 
through its regional offices. Reporting to President Suharto, who called for a consortium for 
that purpose, KADIN's Vice-Chairman Probosutedjo informed him that Rp. 5 billion had 
already been collected at the initiation of two leading Chinese entrepreneurs, Liem Sioe 
Liong and William Soeryadjaya.7 Each time when they distributed the funds, KADIN repre­
sentatives did not fail to stress, as the most important means to success, the creativity and 
hard work of the entrepreneurs themselves rather than outside support.
It was also in this context that a special coordinating body emerged to support the small- 
scale, pribumi-owned companies. The Indonesian Union of Leading Entrepreneurs (IPPI, 
Ikatan Pemuka Pengusaha Indonesia), upon its founding in September 1980, declared that 
its members, consisting of both leading Chinese and indigenous entrepreneurs, would not 
bid for government tenders valued over Rp. 1 billion.8 The figure was ten to twenty times 
higher than the minimum value of government contracts and purchases in which Keppres 
No. 14/1979 permitted the big pribumi or Chinese-owned businesses to participate. Imme­
diately after its organizational meeting in September, IPPI secured Rp. 3 billion as funds to 
be credited to small pribumi business people.9 But because the amount provided to each 
recipient barely reached Rp. 100,000 and because the funds were given out with no collat­
eral, it seemed obvious that they were aimed to show the good will of big business rather 
than to make a sincere effort to support entrepreneurial aspirants. These "charity" activities 
became less publicized after 1980-1981.
At this juncture, various proposals were put forward about how to forge and increase 
cooperative relationships between big and small business.10 The so-called bapak angkat sys­
tem was interesting.11 Because bapak angkat means "adoptive father," the idea was patrimo- 
nialistic: a big company should help a specially selected group of small companies by giving 
credit, contracts, management advice, job training, and other assistance. Because the 
Department of Industry coined the concept, however, no notable progress has been reported 
beyond interpreting the system to mean whatever links already exist between big and small 
companies—a usual end for many proposals and debates in Indonesian business.
KADIN has also accelerated its campaign to embrace and involve more Chinese in the 
organization. For instance, the Executive Board of Directors of KADIN for the term 1982- 
1985 had at least three Chinese as chairmen or vice-chairmen of its fourteen compart­
ments.12 Among them, quite revealingly, were the Compartment of Budget and Treasury,
7Antara, July 20,1980.
8Berita Buana, October 23,1980.
9Antara, October 19,1980.
10See, for example, Kwik Kian Gie, "Pengusaha Kuat Yang Harus Membantu Yang Lemah," Kompas, January 22,
1981; and a newspaper article entitled, "Perusahaan Kecil Dimata Konsultan" in Berita Buana, February 12,1979. 
riPeZite, December 30,1980.
12Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, "Information Guide to the Organization of Kadin Indonesia," 
Jakarta, 1983, pp. 45-52.
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chaired by Mochtar Riady, and that of Small Business Development, chaired by William 
Soeryadjaya. The compartment led by Soeryadjaya aimed to direct various support from the 
large (mainly Chinese-owned) industries to the small (pribumi-owned) industries. Its vice- 
chairman was R. Agung Laksono, the head of the Indonesian Young Entrepreneurs' Asso­
ciation (HIPMI). HIPMI was one of the most outspoken supporters of indigenist public 
policy.
The most remarkable transformation took place in the Indonesian Indigenous Business­
men's Association (HIPPI: Himpunan Pengusaha Pribumi Indonesia). As its name indicates, 
it had been an exclusively pribumi organization until 1984. Its head (Ketua Dewan Pembina) 
was again Probosutedjo and, despite his inconsistent and confusing position, had often 
made demands and complaints in outright favor of the pribumi business people. But when 
Benny Moerdani called for a halt to use of the terms pribumi and nonpribumi, HIPPI 
changed the word pribumi to putera (son or prince) in the organization's name.13 Later Pro­
bosutedjo explained that HIPPI has a "broad and big" meaning. The word putera in HIPPI 
does not mean merely "child" (anak) but "a patriot who loves his motherland, its people and 
country."14 'Thus," he continued, "for whoever is prepared to serve the nation, regardless 
of race or size of business, the door to membership is open wide."15 The only qualification to 
join HIPPI was "truly having the Pancasila spirit."16 Now he was suggesting precisely what 
the state wished for. In fact, a week later, Coordinating Minister of Public Welfare, Alamsjah 
Ratu Prawiranegara, used very similar phrases to second Probosutedjo's idea; "Every 
Indonesian citizen, regardless of place of origin, religion, or conviction, is an Indonesian 
putera who must be loyal to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and has the obligation and 
responsibility to serve his nation and country."17 What Probosutedjo quoted Vice-President 
Umar Wirahadikusumah to have said retained a more concrete recommendation "that the 
pribumi businessmen can work together with any group and learn from able and strong 
businessmen."18
Probosutedjo was a man of his word, at least on this matter. When HIPPI reshuffled its 
leadership one week later, Agus Nursalim, his long-time Chinese business associate, was 
included in the executive council, and an obscure figure of Chinese name, Nurdani Latif (Lie 
Hong Wi), was appointed the treasurer. He assessed their spirit of Pancasila by saying, 
"these people already became good Indonesian putera."19 A more concrete plan came to life 
two months later. In November, HIPPI established a company in Medan to implement 
"pembauran in business between big and small entrepreneurs as well as between entrepre­
neurs of Indonesian origin and those of foreign origin."20 The company, interestingly named 
P. T. Asperindo (Asli Putera Indonesia), had two Chinese directors and a Chinese advisor 
(penasehat).
The group that demanded and benefited the most from the nationalist economic policy 
was the Indonesian Young Entrepreneurs' Association (HIPMI, Himpunan Pengusaha
13Susumu Awanohara, "The Perennial Problem," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 6,1984, p. 27.
^Antara, December 22,1984.
15Ibid.
16Sinar Harapan, October 24,1984 (emphasis mine).
17Sinar Harapan, October 30,1984.
lsMerdeka, October 24,1984 (emphasis mine).
19Antara, September 3,1984.
20Merdeka, November 13,1984.
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Muda Indonesia). But even in HIPMI, it became more apparent as time went on that the 
members realized and appreciated the necessity of Chinese support in materializing the 
government's pro-pribumi programs. They needed more Chinese help than did, probably, 
any other group of pribumi businessmen because of lack of business experience, shortage of 
capital, and their excessive dependence on political connections. I learned from interviews 
with several young pribumi and Chinese businessmen that the younger generation of the 
two ethnic groups cooperated as much as their seniors did. Before the election of HIPMI's 
chair due in early 1986, some young Chinese businessmen actively campaigned for a certain 
candidate with a less racist platform.
HIPMI's anti-Chinese outlook toned down substantially as KADIN became as important 
a patron as the state in the post-oil boom economy. Its members had to accept Chinese busi­
ness people as sources of credit and donations and in their role as "bapak angkat," however 
empty its practical meaning was. Perhaps more important was the polarization of the young 
indigenous business community, which was precipitated by Keppres no. 10/1980. The 
presidential decision gave the children around the most powerful group extraordinary 
opportunities to obtain big government contracts, whereas the immediately ensuing reces­
sion drove out numerous less powerful, young business people.21 In tandem, high govern­
ment officials—including the so-called nationalists—economists, and journalists launched 
deliberate all-out attacks on HIPMI. In retrospect, these attacks were only a prelude to what 
was soon to come. In explaining Keppres nos. 29/1984 and 30/1984, which replaced the 
previous presidential decrees on small-scale government suppliers and contractors, gov­
ernment officials included in the category of the "weak economic group" "those non- 
indigenous Indonesians who have assimilated."22
Although they chose words cautiously, government officials were clear on what they 
wished to convey to the HIPMI members. The powerful State Secretary Soedharmono urged 
them to "apply to their work methods that are pragmatic and practical but are also spirited 
by the concept of high national idealism."23 The ambiguity of this statement cleared when 
he added the following: "You should not accustom yourselves to fiddling around with 
[government] facilities and living on distributing imported goods. Opportunism and 
'protectionist' life-styles, which characterize the attitudes of some HIPMI members, must be 
thrown away." It is important to notice that it was not the technocrats but the so-called 
nationalists who led the campaign to undermine the raison-d'etre of HIPMI. It implies that 
because the technocrats would possibly invite backlash, the nationalists acted in this case as 
defenders of the common interest of the state.
Another minister belonging to the nationalist camp, Minister of Internal Affairs 
Soepardjo Roestam, declared that the day was gone when "the government helped you with 
decrees as the mother fed [the baby] with milk,"24 so "you should not rely on the capacity of 
others including the government."25 A less powerful official, Governor of Greater Jakarta R. 
Soeprapto, spoke in the same vein when he said, somewhat beseechingly, "HIPMI can ex­
plore new business areas [rather than government contracting] in an effort to [support the 
government in tackling] the problem of unemployment" and, "as a government partner, can 
help the growth of the weak economic group in terms of capitalization, marketing as well as
21Shin, "Demystifying the Capitalist State," chap. 7, especially pp. 264-74.
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managerial skills."26 As an ironical distortion, Soeprapto ignored the fact that HIPMI itself 
consisted overwhelmingly of "the weak economic group." For example, in the better-off 
Greater Jakarta (Jaya) branch, 70 to 80 percent of the HIPMI members belonged to this cate­
gory, whereas the remainder were medium and strong business people.27
It seemed that HIPMI also failed to gain sympathy from the parliament, DPR. Receiving 
a visit by HIPMI's Jaya branch leaders, the chairman of the provincial parliament of Jakarta, 
Soedarsono, was more straightforward than the bureaucrats in giving advice. He said that 
"the members of HIPMI Jaya must be capable of developing into self-reliant entrepreneurs 
without depending on the government, because dependence will bring loss back to them 
and weaken their activity and creativity as entrepreneurs."28 Its vice-chairman, H. M. Jufrie, 
remarked that according to his own observation, most HIPMI Jaya members are active only 
in the areas of procurement and service and "should be more oriented toward industrial 
sectors." Another vice-chairman, H. Wim Salamun, ridiculed them by pointing out that 
"HIPMI should be a little more selective in accepting its members.. . .  Do not accept those 
adventurists (pengusaha avonturis) who ruin Hipmi's good reputation."29
By the end of 1984, HIPMI seemed finally to give up its effort to mobilize support from 
outside. Thus the chairman, Agung Laksono, a political aspirant, began to echo what the 
government officials and business people had suggested to him. In the ceremony officially 
accepting thirty-four new members, Laksono warned that "government projects should not 
be the only business area that interests you," adding that "as an entrepreneur, you must be 
able to create your own business, which will help the government in augmenting em­
ployment."30 Probosutedjo, who used to enjoy the spotlight by repeating statements sympa­
thetic to the pribumi, looked like a born-again entrepreneur when he said, "The buildup of 
the weak entrepreneurs should not be carried out through state policies."31 This statement 
was the best and final summary of the position the policymakers and businessmen wanted 
to convey to the small pribumi contractors.
In sharp contrast, the morale of big business was boosted by the aggravated situation of 
the economy and, hence, the credentials it received from various sectors of the society as its 
savior. If government officials, except the technocrats, were hesitant to acknowledge the 
state's own responsibility for the country's economic plight, they agreed with those 
economists who placed their trust in the private sector.
Universities, newspapers, and business organizations organized numerous seminars 
and symposia to discuss how to develop entrepreneurship and promote exports.32 Business
26Ibid. See also, Antara, November 10,1984.
27Berito Buana, August 2,1984.
28Merdeka, October 24,1984.
29Ibid.
3®Suara Karya, November 12,1984.
31Merdeka, December 29, 1984. The Indonesian text reads, "Pembinaan atas pengusaha yang lemah hendaknya 
jangan dilakukan secara politis." It is interesting to note that politis in Indonesian can mean either "political" or 
"in terms of policy." It was clear that Probosutedjo meant the latter from the remark that "if the government 
continues to give credit, the [weak] businessmen will be dragged in an undesirable direction."
32For example, Suara Karya, a Golkar-controlled newspaper, organized a huge seminar in February 1984, in 
which 250 people participated. The participants included most former and present ministers of economic affairs, 
other ministerial-level government officials, leading business people, economists, and journalists. Two of four 
panels addressed the issues of "The Business Climate and the Role of the Private Sector" and "Stimulating Non- 
Oil Exports and Trade Regulations." The papers were published as Peranan Dunia Usaha Dalam Repelita IV 
(Jakarta: Penerbit Suara Karya, 1984). Compare the dominantly "liberal" tones of the proposals to the more or
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schools sponsored by the government and the private sector became increasingly popular, 
and model entrepreneurs were praised and invited to give public talks. The mass media 
regularly provided forums for debates on economic issues, including monopoly and 
oligopoly, the Pancasila economic system, development strategy, state interventionism, the 
weak economic group, and so forth. All these academic activities quickly spread an atmo­
sphere of economic crisis and created a sense that something should be done. In one sense, 
the consensus was predetermined: that is, the state was an obstacle (penghambat) to struc­
tural adjustment and was itself an inefficient sector wasting national resources. A solution 
was easily found, namely, that the private sector should be given the mission of saving the 
economy from the crisis. This rather obvious conclusion yielded several popular concepts, 
which, at their core, praised the market economy. While they reflected the changing struc­
ture of Indonesian capitalism, they, in turn, contributed to expediting the change. In this 
regard, the intellectual contribution corresponds precisely to what Hamza Alavi and John 
Saul saw as the ideological role of the postcolonial state in creating capitalist hegemony.
The key concept summarizing the academic efforts is comparative advantage 
(keunggulan komparatif). Borrowed from the liberal theory of international trade, this term, 
when applied to the Indonesian case, stresses the labor-intensive manufacturing industry as 
the strategic sector for promoting exports. The proponents included most technocrats and 
liberal economists and, interestingly, some "turncoats" from the nationalist economist 
group.33 Inspired by the economic success of the East Asian Newly Industrializing Coun­
tries, and pressed by the aggravating balance-of-payments problem, they looked to increas­
ing exports as the solution. But because oil exports proved too inconsistent and because the 
international prices of other primary exports were also fluctuating violently, the proponents 
suggested that Indonesia's comparative advantage be based on her cheap and abundant 
labor. The low quality of Indonesian labor could stand in the way of this solution as well. 
But because Indonesia's options were extremely limited, economists pushed all the harder 
in this direction and harshly criticized what was collectively called the "high-cost economy" 
(ekonomi biaya tinggi). The state is, of course, chiefly responsible for creating and maintaining 
the high-cost economy.
In the business sector, the comparative advantage school is less refined in its arguments 
and more supportive of the status quo than its economic gurus. On two occasions, when de­
bates on the issues of monopoly and the weak economic group became heated, the followers 
of this school lined up to support monopolies and big corporations with some qualifications. 
And the conclusions from these debates were in near-unanimous favor of them. Therefore, 
the search by the academicians for an alternative development strategy ended by promoting 
the interests of the new capitalists, who were strongly represented in the big businesses, 
monopolies and oligopolies, and the light manufacturing sector.34 The irony is that most of
less indigenist and statist ones of the seminar held nine years earlier on "Strategies to Build up the National Pri­
vate Entrepreneurs/' Seminar Strategi Pembinaan Pengusaha Swasta Nasional, Centre for Strategic and Interna­
tional Studies, May 29-31,1975 (Malang, Indonesia: Parangan Press, 1975). Numerous workshops and seminars 
were also organized by Kompas and Sinar Harapan. See, for example, Kompas, August 23,1985 and September 9, 
1985. See also, Kompas, September 11 and 12,1985 for its long summaries of a symposium organized by the Fac­
ulty of Economics, University of Indonesia.
^Although the quotations that follow in the text are drawn heavily from peranakan Chinese intellectuals, the 
same ideas were shared by most economists and business observers, not to mention the technocrats. Other evi­
dence hinting at the consensus is the wide and intense coverage the leading newspapers and magazines gave to 
their criticisms and suggestions.
34Therefore, the theoretical supports served as an apologetic justification to the existing and increasing 
oligopolies that are not necessarily efficient or competitive. As Hal Hill found recently, the enormously high
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these big business groups were the creation of the state-initiated strategy of import-substitu­
tion industrialization on which the liberal economists launched heavy attacks.
Some economists and business observers were quick to argue that export promotion re­
quires the development of equivalents to the general trading companies, sogo shosha, of 
Japan.* 35 To compete with the multinationals in the international as well as domestic mar­
kets, they contended, Indonesia, too, needs big corporations that have an advantage in pro­
ductivity, costs, and marketing. An evident twist in this proposal is that they emphasized 
only the size of the Japanese general trading companies while avoiding mention of their 
outward orientation and remarkable cost-saving efficiency in production and marketing, 
which Indonesian big business corporations largely lack. Attentive to the guiding role of the 
Japanese state in leading exports, they also argued that the Indonesian state must assume 
the same role in creating favorable environments and providing infrastructures. Yet consid­
ering the precisely opposite role the Indonesian state has played, the idea of "Indonesia 
Inc." again would be too wishful a concept to materialize.36
Wibisono also maintained that two types of monopolies and oligopolies should be dis­
tinguished.37 One he called command monopoly, which is enforced "from 'above/ with 
political 'backing' and a 'command' mechanism."38 This type, mostly found in the public 
sector, is the one at which the criticisms of monopoly should be directed. But the other type, 
the "market oligopolies," must be encouraged, because they are "the outcome of healthy, 
honest, free, and open competition, reflect efficiency, productivity, and creativity, and bene­
fit consumers by providing positive services for consumers' needs." In a somewhat convinc­
ing article, he gave specific examples of the market oligopolies, which were almost exclu­
sively controlled by, in my term, the new capitalists. As industries in which free competition 
created an oligopolistic situation, he listed batteries, clove and regular cigarettes, milk, film, 
toothpaste and detergents, polyester and rayon synthetic fibers, paint, motorcycles, flat and 
safety glasses, monosodium glutamate (MSG), and such auto parts as tires, batteries, and 
spark plugs. Although he took into account neither "nonprice competition" and government 
protection as crucial factors in .creating the oligopolies39 nor their negative effects on con­
sumer prices and employment,40 his notion of market oligopoly contributed effectively to 
justifying,the role of big business.
"seller concentration" of Indonesia is not related to efficiency but to government protection. In addition, Indone­
sia remains, perhaps, the most concentrated economy that Hill knew of in the developing countries, although he 
found it declining slightly between 1975 and 1983. See Hal Hill, "Concentration in Indonesian Manufacturing," 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 23 (2) (1987): 80-82,98.
35"Trading House Nusantara, Seperti Apa?" Informasi 12 (1981): 12-20; "Jaringan Sogo-Shosha," Informasi 5 
(1982): 3-23; Christianto Wibisono, Kearah Indonesia Incorporated, 2 vols. (Jakarta: Yayasan Management 
Informasi, 1985).
^Christianto Wibisono borrows from "Japanese Inc." to conceptualize "Indonesian Inc.," in which the national 
economy can be run as if it were an incorporated company with the state as the management and the private sec­
tor as the production line. Ibid.
37Christianto Wibisono, "Oligopoli Pasar dan Monopoli Komando," Kompas, January 31, 1985; see also, 
"Anatomi Tiga Kelompok Industri," Informasi 3 (1985): 5-19.
^Wibisono, "Oligopoli."
39For details of this criticism, see H. M. T. Oppusunggu, "Semedi Ekonomi," Sinar Harapan, February 14,1985. 
According to Oppusunggu, nonprice competition refers to various "means of competition [other than low prices] 
such as service, warranty, credit, advertisement, packing, and so forth," which weaken the competitiveness of 
new, mainly small, producers.
^For details, see Hasibunan, "Oligopoli di Indonesia: Kasus Sektor Industri," Prisma (April 1985): 21-33.
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Kwik Kian Gie went further than Wibisono to defend monopolies. He argued that most 
critics are not consistent if they blame only the privately owned monopolies while accepting 
the state monopolies. If the state monopolies are justified on the grounds of their public 
service, the private monopolies should also be given credit for their pioneering contribution 
to developing capital-intensive industries and meeting consumer needs. In his view, it was 
not economic reasoning but "social jealousy" (kecemburuan sosial) that stirred up discontent 
with monopolies. He was extremely straightforward to point out that social jealousy is in­
flated because most privately owned monopolies involve non-pribumi business people. To 
be fair, he suggested, the issue should be the general question of rich and poor or of big and 
small capital, instead of a racial one. He then concluded, "In a stable and well-ordered 
country, the absence of monopolies is ideal.. . .  [But] when can Indonesia reach this situa­
tion?"41 He thus suggested clearly that monopolies will be inevitable and necessary until the 
Indonesian economy becomes sufficiently industrialized.42
Another term that surfaced in the economic and business circles was "national assets" 
(kekayaan nasional or asset nasional). In Panglaykim's definition, "[t]he development of 
national businesses in Indonesia, which consist of family-owned groups, and which place 
themselves in the world of the national and the international economy, can be termed 
national assets." He went on to argue that "[i]n the process of their growth, they not only in­
crease employment opportunities but also act as implemented of development programs if 
the business climate is enticing."43 Now, the stress was placed on the contribution big busi­
ness people could make toward creating jobs, paying taxes, earning dollars, promoting 
entrepreneurship, and, in general, developing the national economy.
Indirectly criticizing the government-proposed bapak angkat system, the economist 
Thee Kian Wie, whose concern for economic equality was well known, joined to caution that 
big companies may help small ones by giving subcontracts but that this should not be con­
sidered a long-term solution. Thee suggested that the best and final means to achieve eco­
nomic equality was education and management training. He pointed out that "Indonesian 
society should instead be oriented toward an economy that is not spirituality based]," and that 
"[t]hey [small-scale pribumi businessmen] should be able to behave as the nonpribumi group 
does now."44 No doubt, by the "economy that is not spiritual (ekonomi bukan spiritual)" he 
meant a capitalist economy and expressed it only circuitously because of the widespread 
suspicion of the latter term in Indonesia. His direct reference to the Chinese as rational eco­
nomic actors is surprising but, considering that Thee is himself a peranakan Chinese, such 
negative perception of pribumi entrepreneurs may well have been shared, widely and 
regardless of ethncity, by the business community.
The rejuvenated mood of private capitalism is also evident in a blooming of the business 
press, which has been a phenomenon since the early 1980s. Several business newspapers 
and magazines have come into being, escalating such a mood. Probably its most marked
41Kwik Kian Gie, "Monopoli dan Kecemburuan Sosial," Prisma (April, 1985): 48.
42As an active member of the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), Kwik is an outspoken critic of the 
New Order state's authoritarian rule, corruption, development strategy, and cultural policy. His consistently lib­
eral position on these issues is rare among peranakan Chinese. He is also famous for a direct and logical style of 
debate. For his strong defense of Chinese capital and big capital, see Kwik Kian Gie, "Non-Pribumi, Dominasi 
Ekonomi dan Keadilan Sosial," Kompas, June 23,1978 and idem, "Kapitalis dari Gang Ribald," Tempo, August, 
1986, respectively.
43PanglayUm, Bisnis Keluarga: Perkembangan dan Dampaknya (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Andi Offset, 1984), p. 3; see 
also Tempo, March 31,1984, p. 66.
^Sinar Harapan, October 3,1980 (emphasis mine).
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consequences are opening up Indonesian business and, thus, implicitly promoting a capital­
ist value that business is also a virtue. Not only the business press has a professional interest 
in an open business atmosphere but also its major owners themselves are tied to business 
interests. Although such sensationalist magazines as Jurnal Ekuin, Fokus, and Expo, were 
closed by the government, several economic and business dailies, magazines, newsletters, 
and journals, such as the Business News, Bisnis Indonesia, Neraca, Eksekutif, Swasembada, Forum 
Ekonomi, Indonesian Commercial Newsletter, and Informasi, have flourished with a professional 
approach to economic and business issues.
For all the rhetoric, new concepts, and apparent changes in journalism, it is too soon to 
predict that the ideological campaign will have a significant and marked impact on the pre­
capitalist culture of ordinary Indonesians, particularly in the numerically dominant rural 
sector. Capitalist hegemony in Gramsci's sense will be established only by the fundamental 
transformation of the economic and social structures of Indonesia. A long and intense strug­
gle between new and old ideologies will be waged in the process. It is also premature to 
conclude that the Indonesian state has already committed itself fully to the capitalist pattern 
of economic growth in that capitalist development undermines the state's own dominance 
and autonomy. The New Order state's support for the new capitalists and their mouthpiece, 
intellectuals, could be seen as its temporary accommodation to the economic recession and 
the consequent fiscal crisis facing the state. These doubts and cautions notwithstanding, it is 
safe to argue that the Indonesian state has begun to perform one mission of the postcolonial 
state, namely, creating the hegemony of capitalism—instead of waiting idly for, as John Saul 
says, "an ideological cement for the capitalist system. . .  [to] evolve slowly and surely."45
The Failure of Indigenist Policies and Its Implication
A more substantive move has been the increasingly evident determination of the 
policymakers create a "national capitalist class." This position is ironically reflected in the 
various policies the New Order state initiated in the name of helping the "weak economic 
group" (golongan ekonomi lemah), which the government defined46 as the small and medium 
companies in which pribumi either own at least 50 percent of shares or comprise the major­
ity of the management with capital less than Rp. 25 million for the trading and other service 
sectors and Rp. 100 million for the construction and industrial sectors. The policies, summa­
rized in table 1, are far more modest, inconsequential, and ineffective than the ones carried 
out by Suharto's predecessors.
Most of the policies that came out continuously and under various names after 1971 re­
volved around what Ralph Anspach called credit indigenism.47 Anspach characterized the 
pre-Suharto economic policy making as a frustrating process of increasingly radicalized 
nationalism. The earlier policies under Parliamentary Democracy were failures, followed by 
the more radical and more disastrous ones. The earlier policies oscillated between "credit 
indigenism" and less moderate "decree indigenism." The former method favored the 
"subsidization of indigenous business without further restrictions upon existing or even 
new alien enterprises," whereas the latter used "the police power of the state to intervene 
directly in the market for the benefit of indigenous business" by either allowing "only entry
45Saul, "State," p. 170.
46Reported in Antara, June 7,1979.
47Ralph Anspach, "Indonesia," in Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia, ed. Frank H. 
Golay, Ralph Anspach, M. Ruth Pfanner, and Eliezer B. Ayal (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969). See 
also, Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, "The Political-Economy of Development: The Case of Indonesia under the New 
Order Government, 1966-1978" (Ph.D. diss.. University of California, Berkeley, 1981), pp. 225-38.
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Table 1
The New Order State's Policies to Promote Pribumi Entrepreneurship
Year Institution/Program Implementing Agencies Content
1971 P.T. Askrindo3 Bank Indonesia Insurance on bank loans to the 
small and medium firms
1972 P.T. Upprindob Bank Indonesia/Dutch 
government
Financing small and medium 
firms
1973 P.T. Bahana Bank Indonesia Equity financing (to 12.5%) and 
managerial assistance
1973 KIK/KMKPcd Bank Indonesia; state banks; 
regional development banks
Small fixed investments and 
financing working capital
1974 DSEN decisione None Restriction on foreign investment 
and earlier transfer of PM A shares 
to pribumi partners
1974 Kredit Mini Bank Indonesia; state banks; 
regional development banks
Small credit to small rural 
enterprises (up to Rp 100,000)
1975 Proyek BIPIKf Bank Indonesia; World Bank; 
Department of Industry
Management training to small 
entrepreneurs
Pegals Department of Trade; 
universities
Management training to small 
entrepreneurs
1976 KCK/Inpres Pasarh Budgetary allocation via 
BUUDs1
Small credit to rural traders
1977 P.T. Danareksa Promotion of equity participation 
by pribumis in PMAs
1977 DSPi Department of 
Industry/BKPMk
Restriction on PMA and PMDN 
investments
1979 Keppres no. 14 Government agencies; public 
companies
Giving priority to small pribumi 
suppliers and contractors to the 
government
1980 Keppres no. 14A State banks Credit to the Keppres no. 14/1979 
recipients
Notes: Abbreviations:
aAskrindo (Asuransi Kredit Indonesia): Indonesian Credit Insurance Ltd.
bUpprindo (Usaha Pembiayaan Pembangunan Indonesia): Indonesian Development Finance Company
‘KIK (Kredit Investasi Kecil): Small Investment Credit
dKMKP (Kredit Modal Kerja Permanen): Permanent Working Capital Credit
^ SE N  (Dewan Stabilisasi Ekonomi Nasional): National Council for Economic Stabilization
fProyek BIPIK (Proyek Bimbingan dan Industri Kecil): Small Industry Guidance and Development Project
SPegal (Pengusaha Golongan Ekonomi Lemah): Weak Economic Group Entrepreneur
hKCK (Kredit Candak Kecil): Small Trader Credit
iBUUD (Badan Usaha Unit Desa): Village Working Unit
*DSP (Daftar Skala Prioritas): Investment Priority List
kBKPM (Badan Kordinasi Penanaman Modal): Capital Investment Coordinating Board.
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into a sector to members of the indigenous group," or more extremely, by excluding "all 
aliens from a sector by licensing arrangements."48 The most extreme form of decree indi- 
genism in the pre-Suharto era was best illustrated by the Benteng program. It designated 
certain categories of commodities (increased from about 10 percent of total imports in 1950 
to 85 percent in 1954) to be imported only by bangsa Indonesia asli (native Indonesians). 
Although this program was supported by bank credit, it created a large number of 
"briefcase importers" and a very limited number of bona fide importers.49 It faded out by 
1957. In frustration arising from a series of failed programs, Sukarno mobilized nationalist 
forces to turn to the most radical form yet. This extreme radicalism was epitomized in the 
nationalization campaign of 1958. But the nationalization, in Anspach's words, simply 
"reflected the priority goal of indigenism rather than socialism."50
In the New Order, most policies were in the line of credit indigenism. Typically, the 
government set up companies and sanctioned state banks to finance, coinvest in, or provide 
cheap loans to small and medium companies owned by pribumi (P.T.'s Askrindo, 
Upprindo, and Bahana). Otherwise, it introduced education programs to train managers 
and entrepreneurs (Proyek BIPIK and Pegal). Between 1973 and 1976, several credit systems 
were created to provide part of the capital financing needed by pribumi businessmen to set 
up and run new companies (KIK and KMKP) or to help the rural enterprises and traders 
compete with the Chinese middlemen (KCK and Inpres Mini). By no means, however, did 
these institutions and programs directly infringe upon the dominance and vested interest of 
the big businesses.
In the past two decades, the New Order state's pribumi-supporting policy was closely 
associated with the condition of the national economy. More precisely, it is largely the 
affordability of the economy and the state budget that have determined the course of the 
state's action in responding to "nationalist" demands by small pribumi capitalists and their 
political supporters. In other words, economic recessions and fiscal difficulties of the state 
that must have doubled the hardship of small industries, in fact, brought about few mean­
ingful policies despite their louder complaints and greater demands. For the first few years 
of the New Order, while the economy was busy recovering from the consequences of 
Sukarno's mismanagement and laying groundwork for full-fledged development, small 
capital received little attention, and, in fact, few protests were heard. Since 1982, the sense of 
economic crisis felt by both the state and the business community has overwhelmed the 
outcries of the desperate small capitalists. The mood certainly has favored moving toward 
antistatism and a free-market economy, as discussed.
It was, thus, during the best years of the Indonesian economy, the 1970s, that the state 
worked on the demands of the indigenous entrepreneurs. The latter half of the 1970s wit­
nessed the revival of decree indigenism, although on a far smaller scale than that of the 
sweeping Benteng program of the early 1950s. The catalyst was the Malari affair of 1973- 
1974, which made an issue of economic domination by foreign capital and corrupt associa­
tions between the leadership and the Chinese cukong. The decision in early 1974 by the 
Board for the Stabilization of the National Economy (Dewan Stabilisasi Ekonomi Nasional) 
yielded a guideline for restricting foreign investment and speeding up the foreign investor's 
transfer of the majority shares to the domestic partners. But real action did not follow until
^Anspach, "Indonesia," pp. 123,124.
49Ibid. , pp. 167-79. See also, John O. Sutter, Indonesianisasi: Politics in a Changing Economy, 1940-1955,4  vols., Data 
Paper no. 36 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1959), chap. 24.
^Anspach, "Indonesia," p. 126.
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1977 when P. T. Danareksa, a national trust fund, was established. Danareksa would func­
tion as "an issuing house and underwriter as well as one of the most important stockhold­
ers."51 But because the scheme counted on Jakarta's dormant stock market and because no 
antimonopoly regulations were yet in effect in Indonesia, its failure was guaranteed.
If there has been any notable success with decree indigenism, it was achieved by the 
more forceful Keppres no. 14/1979 and its ensuing Keppres no. 14A/1980, which were later 
superseded by Keppres nos. 29/1984 and 30/1984. The presidential decisions gave the weak 
economic group a priority or exclusive status to receive certain government contracts. For 
government projects and purchases valued under Rp. 25 million, only the weak group 
would be allowed to participate in its tender. For the range between Rp. 25 million and Rp. 
50 million, the government would give a 5 percent premium on the price bid by the contrac­
tor belonging to this category. Although this program recorded modest success for the first 
few years, the ill timing of its launch just before the post-oil boom recession diminished its 
effectiveness. Furthermore, the typical problems with government-sanctioned policies, such 
as corruption, confusion of interpretation, lack of interdepartmental coordination, Ali-Baba 
firms, and abuse by big companies, were widely reported in the first year of the program.52 
Yet the most telling fact is that this policy did not and was not intended to discourage the 
growth of the big business sector. Suharto himself underscored that Keppres no. 14A/1980 
did not mean to discourage "the role of the strong economic group" but only to "give the 
weak economic group opportunities and guidance to become strong."53 In fact, the eco­
nomic sectors that benefited the most from the policy were contracting and construction, 
which had long been congested by small and medium firms and were represented quite 
strongly by state-owned and a few indigenously owned companies.
As the foregoing evidence indicates, the significance of the New Order state's pribumi- 
promotion policy has been undercut by its preference for credit indigenism and by the min­
imal impact of decree indigenism on the dominance of big business. My second argument to 
the same effect is based on the almost negligible government spending and bank credit allo­
cated to the colorfully titled programs. For example, the KIK/KMKP credit was awarded to 
377,529 cases totaling Rp. 203,285 million for the first four years since they were imple­
mented.54 If one considers that the credit took the forms of fixed investments and working 
capital, it is doubtful that slightly over 500,000 rupiah (about US $1,000) per case ever made 
a significant difference in the overall structure of Indonesian capitalism. For the first six 
years (as of the end of the fiscal year 1979/80), Rp. 571 billion was allocated in the form of 
KIK/KMKP and Rp. 20.5 billion in the form of Kredit Mini against Rp. 2.5 trillion of the total 
bank credit for 1979/80 alone.55 Kuntjoro-Jakti gives a similar figure: "By the end of 1978 the 
total cumulative value of KIK-KMKP-Kredit Mini represented only 6.4% of the total 
cumulative value of approved PMDNs."56
Other programs were even more trivial in their achievements. Kuntjoro-Jakti also found 
that for the first six years of implementation, P. T. Askrindo provided insurance on a total 
Rp. 219 billion or Rp. 482,585 per client while P. T. Upprindo carried out only eighty projects
51Kuntjoro-Jakti, "Political Economy," p. 233.
52See, for example, Kompas, October 11,1979; Antara, August 11,1979; Pelita, October 24,1980; Kompas, March 29, 
1980.
^Quoted in Kompas, July 11,1980.
^Kuntjoro-Jakti, "Political Economy," p. 239.
55Antara, June 26,1980.
^Kuntjoro-Jakti, "Political Economy," p. 235.
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with the Rp. 11.5 billion of equity financing.57 The case of P. T. Bahana clearly indicates that 
the institution was nothing more than a showcase; only ten projects were implemented with 
Rp. 600 million between 1973 and 1976. Kredit Candak Kulak amounted to Rp. 87.6 billion 
by September 1980.58
My additional sources of evidence point to the New Order state's soft stance on indi- 
genism. Various problems nullified and distorted the policy objectives, if taken seriously at 
all, in the implementation stage. Corruption, incompetence, confusion over policies, and 
abuse besetting both the implementers—government agencies and state banks—and the 
beneficiaries continued to undermine the cause of such programs. Even if the policy makers 
were seriously committed at the beginning, the dismal outcome of almost every program 
that was implemented weakened the position of its advocates. Because no alternatives have 
been found and because more radical policies had a catastrophic history, the extent and de­
gree of future pribumi-promotion policy are very likely, at most, to remain at the existing 
level.
In fact, no more policies have been initiated to support the small pribumi business peo­
ple since the collapse of oil prices. The Keppres nos. 29/1984 and 30/1984 were the last of 
the ill-fated indigenist programs. Instead, the state's commitment to them have strictly re­
mained within the boundary of pure rhetoric. The cooperative spirit declared in ARTICLE 33 
of the Constitution (UUD'45)59 has often been stressed but how this ambiguous and 
declamatory statement could be materialized interested few policy makers, economists, and 
business people. By 1985, the decision and opinion makers appeared to lean toward the final 
conclusion that the growth of small pribumi capitalists should be achieved by market forces 
and submitted to the free will of the business people involved, or to put it more appropri­
ately, the mercy of the strong economic group.60
This development now clarifies what purposes the numerous policies actually served. 
The making of the "unsuccessful" policies was an ideological project the New Order state 
carried on to cushion the effects of a rapid restructuring of the Indonesian economy in 
which the new capitalists, along with the military-dominated state, rose to dominance. The 
policies, which achieved little progress over time, nevertheless had to be created repeatedly, 
only to make the state appear neutral and above class interests. In the meantime, the repeti­
tion of failures demoralized the advocates for such programs and alternative forms of the 
Indonesian economic system while assuring the new capitalists of the state's commitment to
57Ibid.
58Business News, January 29,1980.
5®The extremely short and ambiguous article of the Constitution invited the persons involved to use their full 
imagination in interpreting it to their liking. Clause 1 of ARTICLE 3 3  reads: "Economy shall be organized coopera­
tively" (official translation). The original text in Indonesian has space for more controversies, which is roughly 
translated as, "Economy shall be organized as a joint venture on the basis of the family spirit" (Perekonomian 
disusun sebagai usaha bersama berdasar atas azas kekeluargaan). This clause, especially the phrase "joint ven­
ture" (usaha bersama), is the only reference to the constitutional foundation of the private sector. Less obscure and 
more words are instead given to the public enterprise in clauses 2 and 3 of the same article. They read respec­
tively as: "Branches of production which are important to the State and which affect the life of most people, shall 
be controlled by the State" and "Land and water and the natural riches therein shall be controlled by the State 
and shall be exploited for the greatest welfare of the people."
^From the long-term perspective, however, this conclusion might well be seen as tentative. Unless the ideologi­
cal project the elites were carrying out in the 1980s leads to the creation of a capitalist hegemony in its truest 
sense, indigenist demands will continue to surface. Policy makers, the condition permitting, may yield to such 
demands. The state's fiscal capacity and the ability of the economy to afford the discriminatory policy meet the 
condition.
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their continued growth. If the state is still in the driver's seat in Indonesia's modernization, 
the industrial strength the capitalists have already accomplished, the economic predicament 
that requires a further procapitalist restructuring, and the steady growth of capitalist ethics 
in Indonesian society all indicate that the formation process of a capitalist class will acceler­
ate, at least, in the foreseeable future.

